>Let it rain

> The Newsboys sing a song called Let It Rain. It is about the apostle Peter before he dies. I think the frequent mention and allusion to water in the song is very clever.

Let It Rain

Fisher of men remembers…

And I have watched in wonder
As with a word You calmed a raging sea
I have seen You make the wine from water
Mud and water made a blind man see
Water still reminds me
Of the seaside where our eyes first met

Chorus
Let it rain
Lord we’re waiting for Your rain to fall
Let it rain
Bringing back the wonder of it all
And I can see Your face again
When You let it rain

And I’ve been bathed in mercy
By every gesture, every word You’ve said
Once I spoke of power and high position
You took a towel and washed my feed instead
Water, like a promise
Heaven opens, but I’m not there yet

Chorus

I’ve been foolish
Thought I know it all
Three times I denied Your name
Your forgiveness, like a waterfall
Washes away my shame

A new dawn is breaking
Another hour, and then I leave this place
I am ready Lord to give my life for you
I’m so ready Lord to see Your face
Water like a promise
And in this final hour I think my final prayer shall be
Would You let it rain?
Let Your Spirit fall afresh on me

Chorus

>Adjusting multiple choice examinations

>Multiple choice examinations have several benefits. They have no intra- or intermarker variability. In fact they can be automated. And I wouldn’t be surprised if they are as effective as any other system in effectively evaluating material.

They need to be well written.

• The correct answer needs to be clearly more correct than other options.
• The correct answer should not be able to be guessed by the construction of the question.
• The order of the answer option should be random.
• A reasonable number of options need to be given.
• And the same number of options for every question.
• A significant number of questions needs to be included.
• The problem with multiple choice questions is the chance element. This can be reduced by increasing the number of questions.

If we have 20 questions with 4 options for each question, then random guessing will lead to people getting 5 correct on average (Exam mark = 25%); 20 / 4. However the range of correct answers will be quite great. Some will get 1 correct (5%), others 10 (50%). Whereas 200 questions will mean that people get 50 correct on average (Exam mark still = 25%), but a much lower range. Some may get 40 correct (20%), others 60 correct (30%).

Thus both exams when taken by people ignorant of the topic will give an average mark of 25%, but the chance of any particular individual getting a high mark is much greater with a smaller number of questions.

This seems obvious based on the examples above. Mathematically the range of marks is (inversely) related to the number of questions. The standard deviation of the range of answer marks is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of questions.

The other issue is standardising the results. Because people are likely to get 25% of the answers correct by chance (for 4 options), then one could subtract 25% from the final mark. So if you get 25% as a raw mark, you likely didn’t know the answer to any of the questions, that is your knowledge is 0%. So we subtract 25% from your mark to get your adjusted mark, which is 0%.

However if you get 100%, it is unlikely you knew 75% and got the other 25% correct by chance. Rather you get the ones you know correct, and you tend to get about a quarter of the ones you don’t know correct. So if you know 50% of the questions you will get 50% plus a quarter of the remaining 50%, that is 12.5%, which gives you a total of 50% + 12.5% = 62.5%. So a raw mark of 62.5% needs to be scaled back to 50%. And 100% means you know all the answers and does not need to be scaled back at all.

So we need to adjust the raw marks linearly to get adjusted marks.

• Let N be the number of questions.
• Let R be the number of options.
• Let X be the number of questions correct.
• Let Y be the adjusted number of questions correct.

Then

• X/N is the raw mark.
• Y/N is the adjusted mark.
• N/R is the chance number of correct answers.

When X = N/R then the mark needs to be adjusted to zero, ie. Y = 0.
When X = N then the mark needs no adjustment, ie. Y = N and Y/N = 1 (= 100%).

The number of questions correct equals the number of questions known plus the remaining number of questions divided by the number of options.

X = Y + (N – Y)/R

Rearranging for Y we get

Y = (RX – N)/(R – 1)

Or as a mark

Y/N = 100% × (RX – N)/N(R – 1)

And any negative numbers are given zero.

>Bursting bubbles…

>…literally. Presumably this was taken on a high speed camera. Very clever.

From Flickr. There are several other similar photos.

>Random quote

>The budget should be balanced, the Treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled, and the assistance to foreign lands should be curtailed lest Rome becomes bankrupt. People must again learn to work, instead of living on public assistance.

Cicero, 106-43 BC

>Internet interlude

>I will be away from the internet for a fortnight. I have some posts scheduled to come up, but I am unlikely to respond to comments.

>The illegitimacy of anti-supernatural causation

>My recent post led to some discussion, mainly in response to my opposition in defining science as methodological naturalism. I think the previous use of the term Natural Philosophy was adequate for the time. It made it clear that it was the study of natural phenomena without the baggage of additional metaphysics that are unnecessary to the practice of science. The subsequent addition of historical science to operational science to encompass all “science” makes short descriptions more difficult.

My contention is that forcing singular past events to be natural (that is not supernatural) is artificial (not genuine) and arbitrary (not determined by necessity); in that if God did make an object, methodological naturalism would prefer the false explanation that man made it over the true explanation that God did. david w states

The difference is artificial if there can be evidence for supernatural causation. How… [can] we know if God made a house?

This is putting the cart before the horse. One cannot argue philosophically that God does not exist thus he cannot make anything thus nothing is made by God. One can argue philosophically the case for and against God, but if there is empirical evidence otherwise, that must be taken into consideration.

To ask what such evidence is for God, but deny that evidence is even possible within one’s philosophy is disingenuous.

If God exists and he made man, and is at least as capable as man then he can make anything man can make. It does not matter whether or not we can identify a particular object is made by God, the fact is this is theoretically possible. And a definition that excludes God from producing something when it possible that he could, and thus God didn’t, even if he did, is fallacious.

I think there is reason to think that God made some objects. But definitive evidence, or even any evidence, that God made something is not necessary to allow that possibility. We allow for that possibility in other situations, such as an unknown culture, or the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence.

It must be recognised that we are looking at effects, thus inferring the source. Extensive knowledge, or any knowledge, about the source is not required beforehand. It is in studying the effect that we theorise about the source.

>Bypassing the argument thru definition

>Choosing one’s terms and labels may be an effective rhetorical technique; albeit frequently a dishonest one. Here are few examples that I find irritating.

Pro abortion as pro-choice

I have concerns with terms used on both sides of this debate, but this the more insidious. It is describing the issue in terms of freedom, but opponents to abortion are by no means anti-freedom. They see the issue as one of murder. I don’t hear “pro-choice” people advocating for the freedom of men to murder adults, or steal property. The pro-freedom position is reasonably described as libertarian. It is true many libertarians are “pro-choice” but this is not universal with some libertarians arguing against abortion. More relevant however is the position “pro-choice” people take otherwise, and this is commonly a socialist leaning position, hardly a paragon of choice or freedom. I would not be surprised to learn that opponents of abortion have a stronger commitment to choice outside the abortion debate.

I don’t particularly like the term “pro-life” either. The debate is about whether a fetus is living in a sense that confers the fetus natural rights. Although I hold this position, many abortion advocates disagree with it. As such they could argue they are pro-life and consistent by opposing capital punishment. I think it preferable to use accurate unloaded terms such as “pro-abortion” and “anti-abortion.”

Science as methodological naturalism

Science does not need to be defined this way and historically it was not. While it may seem somewhat reasonable on the surface, it fails on 2 counts. The meaning and reason for the term “methodological naturalism” is that one can not invoke the supernatural as an explanation, rather science seeks natural explanations for various phenomena. Given that operational science was invented by supernaturalists whose concept of God (immutable) gave them reason to think the world was orderly and thus amenable to repeated observation with an expectation of identical findings, it is uncertain why a definition using “naturalism” needs to be invoked centuries later.

It fails because it does not apply to historical science which has no such non-supernatural limitations yet historical science is considered part of the broader concept of science. And it fails because it contains a philosophical term: Naturalism has a range of claims which are not derived from science, nor does science intrinsically favour naturalism.

Such a term can lead to the claim that science has disproved God. But analysis of this claim will show it to be circular. God is excluded by definition, and any thesis sans God is deemed “scientifically” preferable, even if untrue.

Gender neutral as gender accurate translation

There is debate about how to best translate various Greek words into English in Bible translation. Does one translate masculine pronouns such as “he” inclusively or specifically? Does the Greek word anthropos mean “person” or “man” with generic connotations at times? I do not intend to discuss the merits of both arguments, just note that the inclusive school uses the term “gender accurate” to describe their theory. They argue that an inclusive view is intended by biblical authors, thus improved accuracy. One problem is that the term “accurate” is more synonymous with “precision” than “intention”. The other problem, of course, is that the debate is around which translation theory is the most accurate. Using a term as part of your definition, then claiming something is thus, by definition—often implicitly—resolves nothing.

Suggestion

The reason this annoys me is that the terms are deliberately chosen. Their inventors are not so much trying to frame the debate as circumvent it. I find it disingenuous.

This is not to suggest choosing various terms is intrinsically dishonest. If a different term brings clarity, or is neutral, or both, then it may be preferable.

Sometimes one should consider terms used by his opponents. While the adoption of labels from the opposition is not compulsory, they may sometimes be accurate. Another option is to use historical terms.

>The ropens of Papua New Guinea

>Mike T brings my attention to the incompletely documented creatures called ropens. Several eye-witness accounts describe featherless flying creatures that perch upright on trees on the islands of Papua New Guinea.

Around Manus Island, the wingspan is three to four feet, according to Jim Blume, a missionary in Wau, on the mainland. Blume’s investigations indicate that wingspans may reach ten to fifteen feet in other areas. Whitcomb’s book mentions a few ropens that are even larger, including the ones seen by Hodgkinson and the Australian couple.

I am familiar with a variety of sightings of reptiles that are otherwise thought to be extinct, such as the bunjip. But I had not heard about ropens.

The description seems to be of a pterosaur. What I found particularly interesting about these sightings was the mention of lights on the animals.

Two natives described a ropen holding itself upright on a tree trunk (fruit bats hang upside down from branches), and his book also describes an apparently bioluminescent glow that may help the nocturnal creatures catch fish.

I am not aware that palaeontologists propose bioluminescence in pterosaurs. However previous eye-witnesses have suggested something similar. In his book After the Flood, Bill Cooper quotes Marie Trevelyan’s book Folk-Lore and Folk Stories of Wales, published in 1909.

The woods around Penllin Castle, Glamorgan, had the reputation of being frequented by winged serpents, and these were the terror of old and young alike. An aged inhabitant of Penllyne, who died a few years ago, said that in his boyhood the winged serpents were described as very beautiful. They were coiled when in repose, and “looked as if they were covered with jewels of all sorts. Some of them had crests sparkling with all the colours of the rainbow“. When disturbed they glided swiftly, “sparkling all over,” to their hiding places. When angry, they “flew over people’s heads, with outspread wings, bright, and sometimes with eyes too, like the feathers in a peacock’s tail”. He said it was “no old story invented to frighten children”, but a real fact. His father and uncle had killed some of them, for they were as bad as foxes for poultry. The old man attributed the extinction of the winged serpents to the fact that they were “terrors in the farmyards and coverts” (emphasis mine).

The Welsh description may be iridescence rather than luminescence, but I think the parallel striking. While I know too little about the Papua New Guinea story to vouch for its veracity, the lack of communication between Welsh and New Guinean witnesses concerning a pterosaur trait not otherwise recognised does give one pause.

>A definition of information

>Message theory has been variously defined in terms of how we recognise design, what information means, and how information can be measured.

German engineer Werner Gitt identifies 5 levels of information.

1. Statistics
2. Syntax
3. Semantics
4. Pragmatics
5. Apobetics

I understand the choice of the term “statistics” though I think a preferable term would be something like “storage,” or perhaps “transmission quantity” (as storage media may be redundant).

The level of statistics is concerned with the possible options for each symbol and the number of symbols contained in the text block of interest. The number of symbols for binary are 2: 0,1. For English we have 27: letters and word space (punctuation and numbers excluded). For DNA we have 4: A, T, G, C.

Shannon’s theory of information does analysis at this level. This level is completely devoid of any meaning, and Shannon may give higher values to messages with zero actual meaning, such as random numbers, than to meaningful statements.

Syntax is the choice of code. A deliberate, though arbitrary, convention of what groups of symbols mean. In English “cat” has meaning, but “ith” does not. And “come” has meaning in English and Italian, but not the same meaning. DNA at the gene level has the convention of codons; groups of 3 nucleotides such as CAC which codes for valine.

Semantics are at the level of communicating ideas. The code itself does not communicate ideas. We need words but we talk in sentences. It is at this level we have meaning. Further, it is at this level meaning is invariant. We could communicate the same idea in a different language which would use a different code (syntax) and result in different storage requirements (statistics).

It is at this level (at least) that information (meaning) needs to be considered when discussing gain and loss of information.

Gitt gives a useful illustration of semantics.

A: The bird singed the song.
B: The green freedom prosecuted the cerebrating house.

Sentence B is perfectly correct syntactically, but is semantically meaningless. In contrast, the semantics of sentence A is acceptable, but its syntax is erroneous.

Pragmatics is about action based on the ideas. And apobetics is about the purpose for the action.

Is important to note that much work has been done at the level of statistics. This is probably largely a result of the computer revolution; though possibly partly because this is the easiest level to define and analyse. But statistics does not discriminate meaning from non-meaning.

>Early coding efforts

>I found this comment amusing. Pirate Bay creators are working on an embedded video site named Video Bay. The coding level is claimed to be extreme beta, with the warning

Don’t expect anything to work at all

>An analogy between information and energy

>Information technology is a useful term. We store information and transfer it, all of which is helpful in understanding the information is not matter. However the association with storage capacity means that people may think in terms of size—number of bits—not the nature of what is stored.

This is somewhat analogous to talking about fuel tank capacity. Vehicles need energy to travel and all things being equal a larger fuel tank will supply more energy. But the issue here is energy. If one focuses on fuel tank size he can forget that it matters what is in the fuel tank. Different grades of gasoline contain different amounts of energy, and the same is true for other fuels such as methanol, ethanol, and coal. One can even fill a tank with substances that contain no energy such as sand or water (fusion disregarded). And other forms of energy such as electricity do not even require a petrol tank.

So while fuel tank size can be a proxy for energy, it may be inadequate, or even inappropriate. One must remember that it is energy that is being discussed.

>Establishing the model before doing the maths

>My recent post on information led to a call for a precise definition of what is meant by information. This request is eminently reasonable. I have yet to give an exact mathematical definition, or even an exact philosophical one. The reason is that “information” has a variety of meanings to different people; and the association with computing and information technology colours people’s thinking.

Consider gravity. My understanding is that ideas about gravity around the time of Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton changed the way people thought about motion. Prior to then it was obvious that objects fell to the ground, but the Aristotelian rationale for such motion was that (some) objects tend toward the centre of the earth. And observations would support this claim. Post-Aristotelian physics described the same phenomena, but for a different reason: massive objects attract each other. The stone moves toward the earth, and the earth moves toward the stone; but the earth imperceptibly because of its immense size. Same observation (as much as perceptible) but different explanation.

The old theorem explains pendulums better. Pendulums tend to the centre of the earth so they stop after a time, not doing so immediately because the weight is moving when it gets to the lowest point. Newton’s theory needs friction to explain the same observation; one could argue Newton is less parsimonious. However Newton was shown correct over time. And his theory was well defined, gave predictions, and was generalisable to the heavens.

My diversion was to highlight that the differences between the two approaches did not require them to be rigorously defined. The mass-attraction concepts antedated the maths by a significant amount of time; Newton had to invent maths for his theory! But a philosophical discussion on the merits of objects tending to the centre of the earth versus objects attracting is still very possible.

Similarly, it is possible to discuss other topics in general before rigour is attained, including information.

Information is a non-material concept that contains instructions thru language.

I use the term instruction somewhat broadly including being informed, not just commanded. That is, meaning of some form exists.

>The importance of information in the evolution debate

> Creationists often mention the concept of information as a challenge to the grand theory of evolution.

Information as a concept has long been recognised. It is something all people agree exists even if there is debate about how it is categorised. Archaeologists discovering inscriptions know there is a meaning even if they do not know what the meaning is, and most people would not dispute this. People recognise several things that are designed. Though one could say they do so because they already know these things are designed, such as a car or computer; there are examples of things we are not previously aware of, but we would still recognise intention.

As I have mentioned previously, information is not composed of, nor derived from matter. Of course it can be stored in matter.

There are several concepts of what information is, at least in terms of how we should represent information theory mathematically.

The application to evolution centres on the connection to DNA. DNA is recognised as carrying information. It has meaning. It resembles a blueprint, and metaphorically is one.

We can study how information originates. If the source of all information can be shown to be greater information (that is intelligence), then this conclusion also applies to DNA.

There are 2 potential ways that one could show information cannot be produced by itself. It may be possible to show this mathematically, in which case we can be absolutely certain (or essentially certain if the proof is statistical).

If not mathematically, it may be possible to show this empirically: that is, in investigating all the billions of examples of information that have been directly observed; if all are shown to have come from higher information sources and zero are self producing, then we can be extremely confident of our thesis.

Therefore the impossibility of information coming from non-information, mathematically or empirically, disproves Darwinism. Rather than being a red-herring as is sometimes claimed, information theory is absolutely central.

>Disregarding the rule of law

>Since 1961 until recently the law in New Zealand stated that parents could use physical discipline for the purpose of correction but it was illegal to assault a child. The law was both intrinsically reasonable, clear in its intent, and effective in court. In 2007 the law was modified at the behest of a politician who has a philosophical opposition to the use of corporal punishment.

There was significant citizen opposition to changing the law at the time.

The new law is regarded a shambles. Persons on both sides of the debate have variably stated that it allows and forbids smacking children. Some have even claimed that it forbids using non-physical discipline on a child. And legal scholars have stated that the wording is a mess.

This is not clear legislation. In creating this law, Parliament abandoned its constitutional responsibility to say with clarity just which conduct is criminal.

Here is the wording of the law.

In response to the new law there was a referendum to which the vast majority (88%) of New Zealanders (who responded) voted that: A smack as part of good parental correction should not be a criminal offence.

The current government claimed to oppose the law when it was enacted 2 years ago. They were not in power at the time. Their response to the recent referendum is to say that the current law is working and there is no need to change it. They have also suggested that they will reinforce to the police not to prosecute minor infractions of the law.

I am not certain one can say the law is working when over 200 people have been investigated by the police for smacking since the law came into place (~2 years). And it hasn’t prevented 15 children from being murdered. (The population of the country is 4 million.)

Telling the populace that the police will not prosecute them even though the law states their behaviour is criminal is a request from the state for us to trust them. But a request for trust can only be made by someone that has proven themselves trustworthy. The refusal to change the law despite saying that they didn’t like the original law, despite the fact that the vast majority of New Zealanders want it changed, and despite the fact they are asking the police to disregard the law; proves they are not worthy of the trust they are asking for.

However the major problem here is not about parents being able to physically discipline their children for corrective purposes, as important as that is. What is incredibly pernicious is the idea that actions should be criminalised while the investigators of such actions are told to ignore these actions. Such thinking is stunningly foolish for any person, and malevolent for a politician. It utterly disregards the rule of law. It resembles the monarchy of a vacillating king; where men are praised or condemned at his whim.

The government needs to decide what behaviour they consider criminal and make the law clear. Unclear law where people are uncertain whether or not their behaviour breaks the law, and law that criminalises people but denies it will prosecute them (most of the time), are both unacceptable.

Some may claim that the police often use their discretion in prosecuting crime. This is true. There are several reasons why this may be the case.

• A crime is identified but there is insignificant evidence against the perpetrator.
• The criminal has committed several crimes and the police want to concentrate initially on the most severe.
• Delay is being used to identify further perpetrators.
• Police lack staff to adequately investigate all crimes so choose to focus on what they consider the most important.

The difference in the above examples are that decisions are being made based on what is possible, or practical. It is not the choice to deliberately ignore criminal behaviour.

This kind of approach to law could eventually lead to all citizens being guilty of criminal behaviour and the state arbitrarily prosecuting individuals it finds inconvenient.

Wisdom supporting liberty

Image source

>Optimising a health system

> It could be argued that the state has no place involving itself in healthcare. And I have sympathy with that view. Government should focus first on its primary responsibilities such as justice and national defence. But many governments are involved in healthcare; and the promise to deliver health will attract votes in a democracy. So here are my thoughts of how I think government involvement could be useful and deliver good, cost contained (for the government) healthcare. This is based on my ideas in the previous post.

1. I think that people should be responsible for their own health care including funding.
2. I think the proportion of people needing reasonable funding at some stage in their life means the concept of sharing risk via insurance for most illness is meaningless.
3. I think if people do not take care of their health, they will likely still get care and others will advocate for them; but there will be costs that someone has to cover.

The second point means that individuals each need to save roughly the average amount of money spent per person in their lifetime. If most people use a moderate amount of money in health and that is say $200,000 on average, then every person should be encouraged to save, say, $400,000 over their lifetime, much of which will be used in their later years.

The third point is important because the situation occurring as the result of people making bad decisions will be used to argue for socialised government in the name of caring.

I think the Singaporean system, or a model based on it, is worth considering.

Here is some reading on the Singaporean system as it is.

• International Health Systems: Singapore
• The Singapore Model
• The Singapore health system—achieving positive health outcomes with low expenditure

My proposal is essentially: government enforced compulsory health saving. Because under this proposed system the government will remove itself from the funding, there will be a decreased requirement for tax monies; and the savings will be cost neutral for the individual. The basic rules would be:

1. All workers are to pay 5% of their income into an individual, managed, low-risk health account.
2. There is a tax cut of the same amount so individuals have the same take home pay.
3. Employers are not required to give any money toward their employees account, nor can unions force this issue. This prevents people being locked into jobs because of the health benefits.
4. The money is yours, it cannot be taken by the government, it can be passed on in a will at death to other healthcare accounts, hospitals or medical research; or possibly as cash to the beneficiaries of the will.
5. Compulsory insurance is paid from the account to cover rare, unexpected, high-cost events (eg. kidney failure requiring life long dialysis).
6. You can use your account to pay healthcare costs. The potential healthcare and the costs are determined by government; that is, both what you can get medically and the maximum amount you can pay. It would include doctor, nurse, hospital visits, etc. It would include prescription and immunisation costs. It would cover dental care.
7. You can only cover your own and your dependants healthcare costs.
8. You can purchase a higher level of care, or medical services outside normal practice, but this is unable to come from your healthcare account.
9. All provision is by private providers who can charge what they will, though adequate competition should keep costs down.

This solution intends to do several things. It means that people pay for their own medical care which, while being somewhat unpredictable, is able to be planned for. It intends to minimise government actually paying for individual health. It prevents people making poor decisions from becoming an unsustainable financial burden. It doesn’t add to the burden of employers who do not have a responsibility to the personal health of their workers other than the provision of a safe work environment. Of course employers are free to offer benefits as they wish as part of valuing employees, but there is no financial incentive to do so, nor the need to increasingly complicate tax law. It limits other family members from pressuring individuals to pay for their care. It still allows people to purchase any extra healthcare they wish as money allows (unlike the Canadian system).

There are problems. It does not deal to those who are not employed. It does not deal well with congenital conditions. It does not cover visitors to the country such as tourists. And it does not offer a solution as to how a different system can be transitioned to this. But with medical costs increasing rapidly because of new and better diagnostic and treatment modalities, it is impossible for governments to sustain future expenditures. And when individuals see how much an intervention really does cost, then they may consider whether the benefit is worth it.

>Responsibility and costs for healthcare

> There is much in the news about healthcare due to the current political tinkerings in the US. I have my ideas about structuring a health system, somewhat based on my experience and what I have learnt about the Singaporean system.

There are probably several reasons why costs are so high in the US (and elsewhere). One significant reason is litigation. Until the legislators are willing to cap “compensation” payable then things are unlikely to get cheaper. The argument that someone is entitled to such extreme amounts of money because he suffered harm neglects that these costs will be recovered from future patients. Indemnity insurance in Western, non-US health is significantly less. Consider perhaps $NZ 1000–2000 per annum in New Zealand to > $US 100,000 in the United States.

This aside, if one is to judge healthcare proposals there are several issues around health and economics that need consideration.

Who pays?

I care little if you wish to spend your money on Kopi Luwak? I am content with the brew at the local cafe, or even instant coffee. But I care a lot if you spend my money on such. It doesn’t matter if nationalising health is cost neutral. If that cost is now paid by government and not individuals, then the government obtains that money from individuals via tax. Thus I am forced to cover your health costs, even if I made health choices intended to save me money long term. But the government payment of costs is even more complicated. There is no fixed amount of money. Individual payments to healthcare have different effects on the economy to government payments. Government removal of money from the economy decreases productivity; thus even a cost neutral program will leave the economy poorer in production, thus individuals worse off.

Who gets sick?

It is said that 75% of health expenditure is spent in the last 5 years of people’s lives. Now that is not every person, but it is a lot of them. We don’t know when we are going to die, and the increased medicalisation of our lives means that much is spent as we age and become increasingly infirm and near the end of our life.

This may be money well spent. It may maintain people’s independence. And if it is your own money then do as you will. But as one becomes increasingly unwell he should be assessing his life and making plans for when he dies. And increasing medical possibilities potentially means increased costs. Yes you can spend the last 15 days of your life half conscious hooked up to a respirator in the Intensive Therapy Unit (ITU) with metastatic cancer that has failed 3 previous therapies, but I am not certain this is a gain over symptom control at home or in a hospice. Don’t get me wrong, these things can be hard to predict, and ITU is often appropriate, even if ultimately unsuccessful. And these are decisions for individuals, and we all weigh different options differently. But people need to think about their own mortality.

How many people have high costs?

Following on from costs occurring at the end of life, it needs to be remembered that this is a cost that a high proportion of people will face. Rare expensive events can be covered by spreading the risk, that is how insurance works. But if events become common then every person has to cover their own cost. If we are spending $400,000 over the final years of life for say every second person (the other dying in their sleep after a long healthy life incurring minimal costs), that means we need to collect ~$200,000 per person to cover end of life expenses. People in countries with socialised medicine talk of how they have paid their taxes all their life, and this is true (though some goes to education and roading, and some is frivolously wasted), but I think they are unaware of how quickly the tax that they have paid is used up.

Personal responsibility

Our own health should be something we take responsibility for. It is true that many things happen that we have no control over: accidents, infections, diseases, poor genetics. But much is known about healthy lifestyle. Debates around increased risks of the order of 10–100% are difficult to confirm. But it is clear, for example, that smoking tobacco, morbid obesity, and base jumping do not usually improve one’s health. Healthcare provision should take into account personal responsibility. (Though I think this intrinsically, I am aware that it can become politicised with claims that “politically incorrect behaviour” is “unhealthy”).

The problem with this is people often don’t take responsibility. And when they subsequently get unwell it seems unkind to leave them to suffer the consequences of their decision. Mercy is toward the undeserving.

Isn’t health provision caring for those who are suffering?

Yes, and no. It is true that we should think of caring for those who suffer, at least from a Christian perspective. But previously this has been about providing food and shelter, giving clothes, comforting people in pain. This is something that most individuals can give to another. But modern health care is more extensive. We can diagnose and treat many illnesses, often at significant monetary cost. It is not something that most individuals can do, and it is hard for many individuals to cover the cost of doing so for others. I applaud hospital and charity work in the third world. I think these are excellent endeavours, frequently they do much good for minimal cost. But I am cautious when people say that everyone is entitled to healthcare irrespective of cost. Someone does have to pay and there are competing claims to money. The statement that no cost is too great for good health is just not true.

Health insurance?

People need to rethink this. Healthcare costs are somewhat foreseeable. We can budget for routine doctor visits, prescription costs, spectacles, regular dental care. It should be possible to assess approximately how often people and families need to attend to their health, and budget for this, with a moderate margin. Insurance is not about these costs.

You don’t get insurance to cover the cost of your mortgage each month. If you did, the company would pay your mortgage, and your premiums would cover that plus an overhead. It would be more expensive. Health insurance should be insurance. It is to cover that which you do not expect to use it for. Insurance should have a high excess (save up the excess in discounted premiums and keep it in a bank account) and cover rare (and expensive) events that do not happen to most people. That way you have cheap insurance as an insurance, and you don’t pay overheads for costs that you know are going to be regular.

>Critique of my Young Earth Creationism post

> My post on young earth creationism raised several responses here and at Vox Popoli where it was originally posted. See also here and here. As well as a response on theologyonline.

These responses suggest some further aspects need to be discussed.

It is important for me to clarify what I was trying to do. I deliberately chose to give a scientific/ philosophical defence rather than a scriptural one. I thought it would interest a broader audience. And it is important to realise the issues in this debate are philosophical.

There were 2 main points I wanted to make.

1. There is a fundamental difference between operational and historical science. Thus historical science can be challenged by types of knowledge (such as testimony and documentary knowledge) in a way that operational science cannot be challenged.
2. Evidence against YEC that presupposes evolution is true is invalid. (In fact evidence against any theory presuming a priori that it is false is invalid).

So if people came away unconvinced yet more aware of their own preconceptions, and they could see that YEC is a valid philosophy that can be considered—and either accepted or rejected—then I am content with this.

The main complaints were the lack of positive evidence for YEC and the lack of exegetical support given for the YEC position.

Addressing the lack of positive evidence first. This complaint is reasonable, especially given my title. However the reasons given above are why I was cautious to discuss specific issues. Until these issues are dealt with, debates are frequently at cross purposes. YECists are forever pointing out the assumptions that non-YECists hold.

I had considered that too much discussion on the merits of, say, helium diffusion dating (and why evolutionists disagree with it) would miss the point that evolutionists are assuming ancient dates because they have a prior commitment to such, and thus they are judging other dating methods by their agreement, or not, to radiometric dating. Whereas my position is that the questioning of all dating methods is legitimate. As it was, the debates in the comments still frequently assumed the validity of old earth dogma.

Do YECists not also have a prior commitment to younger dates? Yes, they do. But they admit their commitment to a biblical timeframe. Evolutionists frequently deny their prior commitment and pretend they are somehow more objective, when in fact they are choosing the clocks that suit their purposes.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of more positive evidence of a young earth would have improved the post and it may be something I could address at a later stage.

My choice to avoid a scriptural defence on why the Bible demands YEC was deliberate, as mentioned. I laid out the basic beliefs for the benefit of those who did not know what they were; to clarify what YECists believe and also what they do not believe despite accusations to the contrary. However the responses and a conversation I had with a friend a few weeks ago has suggested that I should probably give the scriptural reasons for the YEC position at some stage.

>New Zealand voters do not wish to criminalise smacking

>Following from my recent post on whether or not parents who smack should be criminals. The preliminary results to the recent New Zealand citizen’s initiated referendum are available. To the question:

• Should a smack as part of good parental correction be a criminal offence in New Zealand?

1.6 million of an eligible 3.0 million people (54%) voted by postal ballot.

Vote Yes

• A smack as part of good parental correction should be a criminal offence

got 12%.

Vote No

• A smack as part of good parental correction should not be a criminal offence

got 88%.

Results of referendums are not binding for New Zealand government.

>Dog food?

> Auckland resident Paea Taufa killed and cooked his dog this past weekend. He was visited by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) but not prosecuted as his actions are legal.

He rendered the dog unconscious with a blow to the head before slitting its throat, which is regarded as humane.

Under the Animal Welfare Act it is legal to kill a dog in New Zealand if the animal is slaughtered swiftly and painlessly.

That did not stop several persons from condemning him and calling for a ban on the consumption of dog meat in New Zealand. SPCA Auckland chief executive Garth Halliday said,

Although we appreciate the difference of cultures that exist in a place like New Zealand, the SPCA finds this sort of treatment of any animal to be totally unacceptable,… Even though the law says you can humanely kill an animal, you should not be treating any animal like this.

And SPCA chief executive Robyn Kippenberger said,

The slaughtering, roasting and eating of a dog or other companion animal is simply abhorrent to our culture as New Zealanders.

Korean Garden Trust spokesman Stanley Park was surprised it was legal in New Zealand. He also stated,

Dog eating may be part of our history, but most Koreans today would consider eating dogs totally barbaric – and our culture actually forbids us making a meal of animals that are considered companions.

Save Animals From Exploitation voiced objection as well. Hans Kriek said,

While we are opposed to the killing of all animals for eating, banning the consumption of dog meat would be a good start.

And a variety of others have expressed their thoughts on this, many of the opponents calling for a ban.

Now I have never tasted dog meat. I don’t have a strong desire to facilitate my consumption of it at a later stage, though I would be prepared to try it, or eat it if offered it in a culture where my refusal would be seen as offensive.

But why the call for banning? You don’t like the idea of eating a dog, don’t eat one.

Kriek’s comment is revealing. He opposes all meat eating and just sees this as a step in eventual banning of all carnivory. It is, however, probably the most consistent position among the opponents.

When people find something icky what makes them strongly desire to prevent everyone else from doing it? These same people would likely strongly object if I imposed bans on their preferred behaviours. I am not a particular fan of tattoos or body piercing, but I do not support calls to make it illegal.

I am all for debate, and some things should be illegal. But the speed at which people are prepared to jump from “I wouldn’t do that” to “no one should ever be allowed to do that” is phenomenal. This in an age when the call for tolerance is greater than at many other times in history.*

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* I am not suggesting I support this age’s call for tolerance, just noting that we are in it—though rapidly moving away from it.

>A defence of Young Earth Creationism

>Young Earth Creationism (YEC) is multifaceted. It is a metaphysical framework; a scripturally informed philosophy of nature which includes a scientific model that seeks to evaluate and explain the world. Thus it touches a variety of topics. There are limits in what can be accomplished with a short blog post, but I think that some clarity can be brought to the debate, specifically identifying the source of the conflict and the domain in which the debate needs to occur.

Antagonism to YEC is predominantly philosophical, rooted in naturalism. Opposition to the YEC position is frequently made using suppositions antagonistic to YEC; the proof of error is therefore in the axioms not the conclusions.

YEC has a long history. It has been the predominant position throughout most of the history of the West, until the introduction of uniformitarian interpretations in the 18th and 19th century by the non-catastrophic geologists. These geologists influenced Darwin and although Darwin didn’t publish his theory till the 19th century, evolutionary-like philosophies have a much older history, somewhat similar ideas proposed by some Greek philosophers. And YECists have good company with the likes of scientists such as Kepler, Newton, Pasteur, and Maxwell. But the issue is not a tradition game or a numbers game, it is: Does YEC accurately describe reality?

The underlying reasons for specific YECist concepts are: the rules of logic as applied to the Bible and science, and the grammatical historical hermeneutic applied to the Bible. YECists take most of Genesis to be historical narrative including the creation, fall, and flood. They think that most occurrences of the word “day” in Genesis 1 mean a usual day because of contextual considerations.

YEC touches several fields including theology: hermeneutics, theodicy; philosophy: philosophy of science, logic; science: biology, genetics, palaeontology, astronomy, geology, climate, thermodynamics; information theory; archaeology; history. (Hermeneutics and logic would be better classified as fields that form YEC belief rather than result from it, as mentioned above).

I wish to cover the following about YEC

• What young earth creationists (YECists) do and do not believe;
• The nature of evidence and science; and
• A discussion focusing on a single aspect of YEC: the age of the earth.

What YEC is

YEC can be summarised as follows:

• The universe is not eternal, it was created by God who is external to the world, self existent, and eternal
• God created the world in 6 usual days
• Nature was corrupted by the Fall of Man
• The earth is about 6000 years old
• The earth was deluged by a global flood about 4500 years ago
• The Bible is inerrant and should be interpreted in a straightforward manner (according to genre)

There are several corollaries from this, though the specifics may vary. The creation model includes:

• Most of the sedimentary layers of rock and enclosed fossils that occur worldwide were formed during the Noachic Flood.
• The earth likely contained a single continent that broke up during or after the Flood
• There was a single ice-age caused by the post-Flood climate
• All land and air animals (of significant size) are descendants of the animals that were on the Ark
• Man has coexisted with all animals that have ever existed
• Natural selection (an analogue of artificial selection) occurs
• Speciation is rapid. It occurs through allelic separation, genetically induced variation, or detrimental mutation (loss of genetic information).
• There are genetic limits to the amount of speciation, diversification, adaption, or breeding that can occur
• Information content of the biosphere cannot increase. Matter cannot create information.
• Information is always the result of an intelligence
• Loss of information can mean improved fitness within a specific environment, that is loss of function can result in improved likelihood of survival.
• Lost information cannot be recovered without reintroduction of the same information (save trivial examples) by breeding or design
• Archaeological artefacts post-date the Flood, which limits their age to a maximum of 4500 years

There are several accusations that are charged against YEC which proponents of YEC do not support or promote; such as

• God (or Satan) created the fossils in situ as a test of our faith
• God created things with false appearance of age (this needs qualification)
• Animals were created how they look now and no new species of animals have developed
• Entropy was a result of and did not exist before the Fall of Man
• The earth is flat

On evidence and science

While much could be written in defence of the specific YEC beliefs, discussion can be difficult if foundational issues are not identified.

Modern science was originally a systematised process of categorising our observations to make further inferences and reduce our observations to consistent laws. While hypothesis testing is a usual method, data gathering to create a hypothesis was seen as legitimate. Thus, multiple measurements of the planets led to Kepler proposing elliptical orbits, which could then be further tested. Francis Bacon is frequently credited with formulating the scientific method. Written as:

observation → induction → hypothesis → test hypothesis by experiment → proof/disproof → knowledge

Popper’s falsifiability criterion has had a clarifying influence on the understanding of scientific theories. Therefore negative evidence was seen as disproving a theory whilst positive evidence is merely consistent with a theory, not proof of such.

Notice that Bacon’s definition is necessarily limited to observable phenomena. This is classic operational science (also called empirical science), which helps us infer laws about things that are demonstrable and repeatable. This is an enormously important distinction that frequently goes unrecognised. In contrast, inferences about previous events are not repeatable. This does not mean that the scientific method cannot be employed, rather that it is limited in what it can say.

Consider the science of identifying a criminal via a DNA sample. This science is not being done to discover how DNA binds to itself (i.e. hydrogen bonding), it is attempting to establish an event such as a murder.

So a fragment of the DNA is identified and then matched to a specific person. The samples can be run several times and in several different ways; both the forensic sample and the suspects’ samples. And we can establish that the forensic sample and a suspect sample match. This part of the process is operational science.

However establishing a particular suspect as the murderer is not observable. We cannot do an experiment several times to show that he did indeed murder the victim. Intrinsically it is impossible; the event happened in the past. And even if we establish he is capable of murder, it doesn’t prove he committed this particular murder. This kind of science is called historical science.

It has been claimed that scientists do not discriminate this way when practising science. This may be the case. When one does historical science there is usually an element of operational science as seen in this example (though the converse is not necessarily true). But whether actual scientists discriminate like this is irrelevant to the philosophy of science, what matters is whether this distinction exists. And it clearly exists because a methodology that relies on repeatability cannot be applied to singular past events.

The reason for this discussion is to show that historical science competes with other evidences in a way that operational science does not. If I claim my house is so high, I can invite you to m
easure it. Testimonial evidence doesn’t play a part. We don’t ask a range of people their opinion as to what they think my house height is. 3 measurements by several engineers using differing methods that all agree trump the opinion of a dozen opinions and guesses. This is not the case with historical science.

Returning to our murder investigation with DNA sampling, all we have established is that a suspect shares a DNA fingerprint with a crime scene sample. This may be because it is a limited test, say a portion of DNA with a limited number of polymorphisms. Even if we can be certain the DNA matches by performing adequate sequencing, there may be a identical twin brother we do not know about. Or the DNA may have come from the suspect, but at another time; a meeting earlier in the day. Now I am not trying to imply that DNA testing is inaccurate or inappropriate for criminal investigation, I am illustrating how its use in proving crime is intrinsically different from operational science.

Testimony of others meant little in the height of my house, but it means a great deal in identifying a murderer. Not because murder is more important that house height, but because it is not testable in the way that heights and widths of objects are. A claim that the suspect has a twin brother is a competing claim against the DNA test. A claim that the suspect was seen elsewhere at the time of the murder is a competing claim. A claim that the blood type does not match despite the DNA matching is a competing claim.

Note that competing claims against historical science can be both scientific and non-scientific (eg. testimonial).

Also note that scientific claims do not automatically trump non-scientific claims. The testimony of a thousand witnesses is not overturned by a DNA match just because the latter is scientific. We weigh several competing claims and people will be variously convinced depending on how reliable they regard each piece of evidence.

YEC is a competing claim about the history of the world. It is predominantly a competing claim to the historical sciences of biological macro-evolution, abiogenesis, stellar evolution, and uniformitarian geology.

Some of the YEC disagreement with evolutionary theory is due to consideration of non-scientific fields such as documentary evidence. However much of the disagreement is from a competing but different historical science. For example, consider the age of the earth.

How old is the earth?

YECists claim that the earth is about 6000 years old (though anything below 10000 years would fall into the same range). This is phenomenally different to the uniformitarian geological claim of 4.5 billion years. But note that any usual clock cannot calculate the time since the formation of the earth. We cannot go back, set our stop-watch, and mark off the aeons until now. We are considering a past event (or several past events). Compare this to measuring the time it takes a horse to run 1 km. We can do this measuring the starting and finishing time, and we can do this repeatedly, thus giving us the time (on average) the horse takes. For this we observe established clocks.

For past events we need to establish a historical clock, say radiometric-dating. Experiments can determine the amount of various isotopes of uranium and lead in a particular sample. One can do this part of the experiment over and over. We can satisfy ourselves to the limits of experimental accuracy that the sample contains a certain amount of uranium. This part of the investigation is operational science. All parties generally agree on the number of atoms identified in the sample and their ratio.

This ratio is then keyed into a formula based on a specific theory with a variety of assumptions to get a date for the formation of the mineral it was derived from. Now the theory is radioactive decay, which is reasonably well established, and an assumption is, say, no daughter isotope was present when the mineral formed.

The problem is that these calculations do not always give the answers that are thought to be correct (as established by other historical clocks or underlying evolutionary theory); so sub-theories are added, such as leaching of isotopes, addition of isotopes, incomplete melting at time of formation of mineral in rock. Creationists have also suggested a modification to the theory: the variation of decay half-life, though this modification is often disparaged.

Rather than discuss the merits of these sub-theories or, if you prefer, alteration of assumptions (all of which are reasonable); I would simply like to note that since radiometric dating is a historical science, there are competing claims.

There is the competing documentary claim, that the world was created 6000 years ago according to the Bible. This is a claim that YECists take seriously, much like the testimony of someone who witnessed an event. But documentary evidence is not restricted to the Bible. A variety of cultures have given an age of the earth much less than 4.5 billion years and more in keeping with the biblical figure, such as the Mayans and the Greeks. This particular competing claim is less convincing to agnostics and some theists, including some Christians. There are, however, other documentary claims and historical scientific claims that are worth mentioning.

Staying with radiometric dating, we have reliable documentary evidence for the age of some volcanic episodes. It so happens that rocks from lava flows within recent history that we know the real age of (via operational science) are consistently dated much older by radiometric dating, frequently hundreds of thousands of years or older. Explanations are offered up as to why this is the case, but the greater point is the model is reliably incorrect; it doesn’t matter how good this theory is or should be, the fact is the model doesn’t work.

If radiometric dating cannot get dates correct when we do know the true age, why should we trust it when we don’t know the true age?

We also have competing scientific claims. Radiometric dating is not the only historical clock. There are a large number of clocks. And even radiometric clocks vary depending on the isotope used.

Historical clocks often give maximum ages. This does not mean that the calculated age is the actual age, rather given the most favourable assumptions this is the longest a particular process has been going on. In constructing a clock based on sodium in the ocean, a maximum age would be established by assuming no sodium in the ocean when it formed, the lowest reasonable estimate for sodium influx, the highest reasonable estimate for sodium outflux, with the current concentration identified by measurements of salinity. The maximum age identified may not equal the true age, as the ocean may have started somewhat salty for example.

Within radiometric dating we have carbon dating competing with metal dating. Pretty much all carbon containing materials that have been tested contain carbon-14. This places an upper bound on their age. This includes diamonds embedded in rock supposedly millions of years old.

Other historical clocks include: diffusion rates of helium; decay of the magnetic field; decay of DNA and protein from dead organisms; elements in the ocean; recession of the moon, starlight travel from distant stars.

Objections can be raised against these other clocks (though the carbon-14 data is hard to surmount), but this is hardly the point. The point is that there are competing claims here. Radiometric dating of metals is favoured by the evolutionists because it gives a time frame needed for evolution. But it is one piece of historical scientific evidence. One person may find it convincing, but with so much riding against it, it is not unreasonable to weigh the other evidences heavier.

Summary

YEC is a worldview. It recognises a variety of evidences. It clearly understands the difference between operational and historical science
. YECists do not dispute any significant operational scientific finding. Investigating past events is philosophically distinct from investigating repeatable events and YEC views past events differently, and in a way that I think makes more sense of the data.

YEC theory on the age of the earth is more parsimonious. It is consistent with much of the documentary evidence. It is also consistent with many of the historical scientific clocks. Modifications to the starting conditions and rates give ages consistent with a young earth, including radio-carbon. Radio-dates of metals less so, but these are known to be inaccurate, and YEC proposals concerning rates of decay may resolve other well recognised difficulties of radiometric dating. Ancient earth theory is unable to easily reconcile non-radiometric clocks or even radio-carbon clocks.

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Thanks to Paladin and AndyM for their suggestions.